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Abstract
Hoekman analyzes  what actions could be taken  in  the  modalities for  both goods and services-related  market
context  of the World Trade  Organization's  Doha  access  issues,  as well  as  rule-making in regulatory  areas.
negotiations to  assist countries  in reaping benefits  from  Throughout the analysis,  the  author refers  to the work of
deeper trade  integration.  He discusses  the policy agenda  J.  Michael Finger,  whose numerous writings  in  this area
that confronts many  developing countries  and identifies  a  have not only greatly  influenced the thinking  of
number of focal points that could  be used both as targets  policymakers and researchers  on the interaction  between
and as  benchmarks  to increase  the likelihood that WTO  trade  policy, economic development,  and the  GATT/
negotiations will support development.  To achieve  these  WTO trading system, but also provides a model for how
targets,  Hoekman  proposes a number of negotiating  to pursue  effective  policy  research.
This  paper-a  product  of Trade,  Development  Research  Group-is part of a larger  effort  in  the  group  to analyze  the
development  aspects of WTO  rules.  Copies of the  paper are  available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street NW,
Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Paulina  Flewitt,  room MC3-333,  telephone 202-473-2724,  fax 202-522-1159,
email  address  pflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
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data.Economic Development  and the WTO After Doha
The November 2001  "Doha Development Agenda" puts development concerns at the
core of WTO deliberations. The challenge confronting the trade and development
communities-national  trade officials, development agencies and NGOs, and their
constituencies-is to achieve  an outcome that supports poverty-reducing  economic
growth. This is not a new issue. Analyzing what would constitute a good outcome  for
development has been an important focus of Mike Finger's policy research over a 25-
year span. His work identifies many desirable elements of such an outcome, including
liberalization of market access on a nondiscriminatory basis; disciplining the use of
instruments of contingent protection such as antidumping; and adopting a more
development-oriented  approach to the design and implementation of WTO rules. How to
achieve these objectives has also been the focus of his work-Finger has consistently
emphasized that socially desirable reform requires policy research that mobilizes
stakeholders who stand to gain from socially-beneficial  changes in the status quo.
A major difference beitween the situation that prevails today and that in the 1970s
when Mike Finger wrote his seminal papers on the political economy of GATT
negotiations is that developing  countries have unilaterally reduced the average level and
dispersion of protection.  These reforms,  and the associated expansion in export
production that they generated,  have increased the interest of developing countries to play
the GATT/WTO game of reciprocity.  Not doing so in the past proved costly to
developing countries. Finger (1 974, 1976a) documented how, despite the MFN rule,
GATT negotiators  chose commodities  so as to 'internalize'  the benefits of tariff cuts.
Thus, negotiated reductions primarily benefited so-called principal  suppliers, implying
that the developing country strategy of not participating  in reciprocal exchanges  of
concessions led to fewer reductions of tariffs affecting their exports. Finger (1975,
1976b) and Finger and Kreinin (1976) also showed that the flip side of 'special and
differential'  treatment-relying on unilateral preferences such as the Generalized  System
of Preferences (GSP) and the US offshore assembly provisions-was of limited value to
developing countries.Finger has long pointed out that tariff reductions-preferential  or not-on a
developing country's exports are less important than those on its imports. He has also
been a consistent critic of the idea that the GATT/WTO process will lead to good trade
policy (Finger 199 lb; Finger and Winters,  1998). Among the first to seriously analyze
the economics  of antidumping and safeguards  (Finger 1981b;  Finger, Hall and Nelson,
1982; Finger  1993a), more recently he focused attention on the risks of addressing
domestic regulatory policies in the WTO if this entails adoption of standards applied in
high-income  countries. These can be costly-and perhaps inappropriate-for  poor
countries to implement (Finger and Schuler, 2000; Finger and Nogues, 2001).
The implementation problems associated with a number of Uruguay Round
agreements, combined with the persistence  of tariff peaks and OECD production and
export subsidies for agricultural commodities has led to a 'development credibility'
deficit for the WTO. The extent to which remaining market access barriers are removed,
the development relevance  of WTO rule-making is improved and implementation issues
and constraints are addressed will determine whether the Doha Development Agenda
lives up to its name. As noted in Finger (1979), the GATT process involves exporters
seeking market access abroad pressing import-competing sectors to concede  it at home.
This dynamic began to break down in the late 1980s when US legislation provided an
alternative route for exporters to open foreign markets - Section 301, which authorized
unilateral trade sanctions against trade-restricting  partners  (Bhagwati and Patrick,  1990;
Finger,  1991 a). With the spread of regional integration agreements (Finger,  1993b) and
duty-free treatment provisions for imports used in export production, many
multinationals have little incentive to invest resources  in support of traditional
merchandise trade liberalization.  As a result, reciprocity must be sought increasingly  in
other areas such as services and domestic regulatory policy cominitments. The latter are
more complex than tariffs and quotas to negotiate.
The basic rules of the GATT-progressive  liberalization of bound tariffs and non-
discrimination-generally  ensured that in the reciprocal exchange of "concessions"  a
country would not make mistakes. It benefited from its own reductions of import
restrictions and from those of its negotiating partners.  A country could therefore safely
delegate authority to its negotiators (the agents in the GATT game) to make decisions on
2behalf of principals.  There was little need for oversight from civil society or even from
governrment officials charged to evaluate the national economic interest as the outcome
would generally be welfare improving (although certainly not optimizing). This is not the
case when it comes to domestic regulation.  It is not easy-and perhaps impossible-to
trade 'concessions'.  Thus, negotiators have focused instead on the identification of
specific rules that should be adopted by all.  However, as Finger pointed out in regard to
the Uruguay Round, the intellectual  property one country has to nurture may be quite
different from that of another.  The customs system that makes sense will differ depending
on the problems a customs administration  faces. Thus the conclusion that in contrast to
traditional trade liberalization,  when it comes to regulation, one size does not fit all
(Finger and Nogues, 2001).
An important conclusion emerging from Finger's work is the need for the
research community in developing countries to engage-in an identifying what is in the
national  interest and to mobilize support for better policies. The need for such policy
research and engagement has been a consistent theme in Finger's writing (Finger 198 la,
1982,  1986; Finger and Olechowski,  1987). So has been the corollary emphasis on the
need for research leadership by international  organizations  such as UNCTAD and the
World Bank-to name two organizations for which Finger worked during his career-
and the importance of strenglhening the analytical capacity of local think tanks and
policy institutes through collaborative research projects.
The policy impact of Finger's research on the lessons of the Uruguay Round for
developing  countries has been enormous. His work on other aspects of the GAT.  T/WTO
has been very influential among his peers, although it has unfortunately had less of an
impact on policymakers (the spread of antidumping being the most obvious example!).
This paper distils some of the lessons offered by Finger's work over several decades  and
applies them to the question how the Doha Development Agenda could be used to
increase the 'development relevance'  of the trading system for low-income countries.  I
start with a brief overview of the agenda at the national level (Section  1), as this is critical
to answering the question-posed in Section 2-what actions could be taken al: the
multilateral level to help countries to benefit from deeper trade integration into the world
economy.  Section 3 identifies a number of focal points that could be used both as targets
3and as benchmarks to determine the extent to which the outcome of negotiations supports
development.  Section 4 concludes.
1.  The Trade Agenda  at the National Level
Realizing the potential gains from trade is a complex and difficult process. Despite efforts
to liberalize trade, success in integrating into the world economy is far from universal. In
part this reflects continued anti-export biases created by remaining border trade policies
and the absence of complementary measures that are important to create an enabling
environment for supply-side responses to changed incentives are needed. 'Behind the
border' barriers to trade integration-for example, lack of access to finance,  high cost
and low quality distribution and transport services-can be more important obstacles than
border barriers such as tariffs. Absent supporting health and education services that
expand human capital, the long-term dynamic gains of trade liberalization will be limited.
An important issue is therefore to supplement initiatives to reduce the average
level and the dispersion of border protection with measures to lower trade transactions
and operating costs. Regulatory reforms may be called for to ensure that supply responses
to liberalization are efficient, equitable  and enduring. Enhancing the efficiency and
competitiveness  of service sectors-both public and private, promoting access to
information and technology,  strengthening trade-related institutions  such as customs and
standardization  bodies, and improving transport infrastructure  are all elements of the
trade agenda, although priorities will differ depending  on country circumstances.  In many
low-income  countries priority areas  for action are to strengthen institutions such as
customs, reduce transport costs and ensuring that export marketing and product standards
are satisfied. In countries where tariffs and other trade barriers remain high, the priority is
likely to be lower trade restrictions. Table 1 provides a summary illustrative matrix
mapping 'types'  of countries against priority areas and activities that may be called for.
There is great diversity across countries. Determining what are priorities requires
country-specific  analysis.  In all cases there will be a variety of complementary actions
needed to benefit from trade policy related reforms, in particular macroeconomic
stability, prevention of significant real exchange rate appreciation, and mechanisms to
deal with external  shocks and distributional conflicts.
4Table 1: Illustration of possible priorities in different types of countries
Country type  TraditiontaI trade policies  Behind the bor  er trade policies
Policy  Institutions  Policy  Institutions
Low income:  Reduce tariff  Strengthen  Enhance efficiency  of  Strengthen  national
weak institutions,  dispersion;  customs; consider  transport and transit  capacity to design trade
high fiscal  develop  free trade zones as  regimes;  maintain  and regulatory policies;
dependence on  domestic tax  catalyst for exports  competitive real  Upgrade product
tariffs  bases  exchange  rate  standards bodies
Low income:  Reduce border  Reduce red tape;  Promote competition  Strengthen standards
strong role of the  barriers  adopt drawback or  in service industries,  setting an(d certification
State, high  significantly;  temporary  including through  bodies. Efficient
protection; high  reduce tariff  admission customs  FDI and privatization  regulation to achieve
transactions costs  dispersion  schemes  social objectives
Transition  Maintain  Develop customs  Develop legal and  Develop national
economy  relatively low  and related  regulatory regimes  capacity to
and uniform  infrastructure  for services  design/enforce
tariffs  regulatory policies
Middle  income,  Lower tariff  Adopt ex post  Enhance technology  Strengthen enforcement
small, low average  peaks  controls to  and E-commerce-  of prudential  regulation
protection  facilitate trade  related policies
Middle income,  Reduce average  Reduce red tape;  Services  Pro-competitive  and
large, high  and dispersion  implement trade  liberalization;  end  prudential regulation;
protection  of protection  facilitation  monopolies;  develop  establish competition
_  measures  competition policy  authorities
Border barriers  remain important in many low-income countries
Wlhile significant liberalization has occurred in developing countries.  However,
traditional trade policies continue to imply significant anti-export biases in South Asia
and the Middle East. Average  (unweighted) tariffs  in these regions are in the 20 percent
range or higher, and still have far to fall in order to attain the  10 percent average found in
many nations in East Asia, Latin America and Europe and Central Asia (Table  2.). Tariff
revenue remains important foir many low-income countries. Pursuing further ref:)rm of
the level and structure of the tariff requires development of alternative domestic tax bases
and efforts to ensure that a reliance  on revenue tariffs does not needlessly distorlt resource
allocation incentives-e.g., move towards uniformity (Tarr, 2002).  In the small number
of countries where nontariff barriers continue to be used, tariffication will generally
generate  revenues. In considering further trade liberalization, determining the incidence
of the tariff structure and the implications of this incidence-especially  for the poor-is
important in designing and mobilizing support for reform.
5Table 2: Average Unweighted  Tariff Rates By  Region
Region  1978-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-99
Africa  38.2  29.3  26.9  22.3  17.8
East Asia  23.5  26.9  20.7  14.6  10.4
LatinAmerica  28.1  26.4  24.1  13.9  11.1
MENA (ex-OPEC)  29.6  24.6  24.1  22.9  19.3
South Asia  NA  71.9  69.8  38.9  30.7
Europe/Central  Asia  12.0  21.6  14.9  8.1  10.1
Industrial economies  11.9  8.9  8.2  6.8  6.1
Source: World Bank.
Table 3. Frequency of core NTBs in developing  countries, 1989-98
Country  1989-94  1995-98
East Asia and the Pacific (7)  30.1  16.3
Latin America and the Caribbean (13)  18.3  8.0
Middle East and North Africa (4)  43.8  16.6
South Asia (4)  57.0  58.3
Sub-Saharan  Africa (12)  26.0  10.4
Note: Parentheses  indicate the number of countries per region for which data are available.
Source: World Bank.
The 'border agenda" in many low-income countries is more institutional than
trade policy related.  Although non-tariff barriers have come down substantially in most
developing countries (with the exception of South Asia)-a major achievement (Table
3)-inefficiencies  in public administration are often an impediment to trade. Customs
clearance  and logistics related transactions costs can be a major disincentive for
investment in tradable sectors, especially  in activities that are time sensitive or where it is
important to be integrated into global production networks that operate on the basis of
just-in-time supply chain management.  Exporters must have access to imported
intermediate  inputs at world market prices in order to be competitive.  In countries where
tariffs continue to be needed for revenue mobilization this requires well-functioning
customs regimes that refund taxes paid on imported inputs, or, preferably,  allow
exporters to import inputs duty free (so-called temporary admission or green channel
treatment). Many low-income countries do not have well-functioning drawback regimes,
creating anti-export bias.
6The  'behind  the border' trade agenda
A supporting legal and regulatory environment is vital for trade liberalization to serve as
an engine of growth. As ment:ioned, this goes far beyond trade-related policy. Elements
of the associated  'behind the  border' trade agenda that affect the investment clirnate
include policies and institutiens that support the participation of national firms on
international markets and measures to enhance their competitiveness  by ensuring access
to crucial services inputs-both public and private.
Key areas  in many low-income countries are product standards and services.
Modernization of standards systems, including institutions and infrastructure  for
certification and conformity assessment is needed to operate in the current global trade
environment.  Meeting international  standards for quality, health and safety is increasingly
a precondition for contesting international markets and has become a major factor
constraining the ability of mEuy exporters  in least developed countries (LDCs) from
benefiting fully from recent preferential  access initiatives. Many low-income countries
are not adequately equipped to deal with rapidly tightening product standards and
labeling requirements and confront major investment requirements in order to do so
(Henson et al. 2001; Wilson,  2002).
The availability of low cost, high quality services is a critical determinant of the
competitiveness  of national firms. An efficient, diversified and well-regulated  financial
sector is necessary to fund investment needs and allocate  resources to where they have
the highest returns. Telecommunications  are both a vital intermediate input and crucial to
the dissemination and diffusion of knowledge. Transportation  costs are a major
determinant of competitiveness-the  cost of international .transport is often above the
applicable tariff in export mErkets, and intra-national transport costs can be a multiple of
international costs (Fink, Mattoo and Neagu, 2000). Research has shown that measures
aimed at reducing the cost ol services that facilitate trade can easily have economy-wide
welfare benefits that are a multiple of those associated with merchandise  liberalization
(Deardorff, 2001; Stern,  2002), and, indeed, may be a precondition  for benefiting  from
such liberalization.
7Initiatives to strengthen private and public service institutions that support export
development-access to credit, modernization of product standards conformity
assessment systems-and to reduce the cost of key inputs (transport, telecoms, insurance,
finance, etc.) should be pursued in the context of an overall national strategic framework
that identifies where the payoff to reform and public investment is largest. Careful policy
analysis is needed to identify both priorities and options for reform. In many cases pro-
competitive reforms will be needed, as greater competition (contestability of markets) is a
major engine for reducing prices and increasing the variety of goods and services. The
competition agenda is often a complex one that involves numerous policy instruments,
from liberalization of trade and elimination of entry restrictions through pro-competitive
regulation and enforcement of competition law.
Whatever the priorities are, in all countries there is a need for complementary
macroeconomic, education, health and technology policies.  Separating out the trade
agenda from the development  agenda more broadly defined is difficult, if not impossible.
The key need, one emphasized by Finger (2001), is that trade is integrated into the
national development  strategy. Only then will an informed assessment be possible
regarding if and how issues should be addressed in the WTO.
2.  What can the WTO do?
The WTO has a potentially  important role in promoting development prospects by
reducing trade barriers, helping governments to move towards good trade policies,
improving the development relevance of rule making and dealing more effectively with
implementation constraints confronted by poor members. The WTO can do very little to
assist governments and civil society to address the numerous behind the border policy
and institutional challenges confronting low-income countries that were briefly
summarized above. What its members  can do is to use it to reduce market access barriers
and ensure that the rules of the trade game support the development prospects of poor
countries: i.e., do not require governments to allocate  resources to non-priority areas or
constrain them from adopting national welfare-enhancing policies.
8Market access  for goods and  s,:ervices
A great deal of research has documented that there is still a large market access-related
agenda. Further liberalization  will significantly increase real incomes and reduce poverty
in developing  countries (Finger and Schuknecht, 2001; Hertel, 2000; Oxfam, 2002;
World Bank, 2001). The extent to which developing and industrialized country trade
barriers are lowered, tariff peaks and escalation removed, export subsidies eliminated and
production subsidies replaced with less trade distorting measures will define to an
important extent the development relevance of WTO talks. Such actions will prilmarily
benefit consumers and taxpayers  in the countries pursuing reform, whose gains would
greatly exceed the losses of affected workers and industries.
Protection in OECD countries currently imposes costs on developing countries
that exceed official development assistance flows (some $45 billion per year). Benefits to
developing countries from abolishing their own protection are over $60 billion. (Global
protection of trade in merchandise costs the world economy some $250 billion (Hertel
and Martin, 2000). If current policies restricting trade in services are considered, the
figure can easily double or more (Stem, 2002). Add in the trade chilling effect of
instruments of contingent protection (antidumping,  safeguards) and the real income gains
from elimination of redundant red tape at borders and it is clear that the benefits of
reducing market access barriers are enormous.
Although average most-favored-nation  (MFN) tariffs in the Quad (Canada, the
EU, Japan and the US) have ifallen to about 5 percent, tariffs for some commodities  are
over  100 percent.  Such tariff peaks are often concentrated  in products that are o-f export
interest to developing  countries. They include major agricultural staple food products,
such as sugar, cereals  and fis!b; tobacco  and certain alcoholic beverages;  fruits and
vegetables; food industry products with a high sugar content, clothing and footwvear.  The
Uruguay Round actually increased tariff dispersion,  as tariffication of non-tarifl'barriers
(NTBs) in agriculture led to ihe imposition of high duties on agricultural products that
had previously been quota constrained.  As a result, tariffs that are more than three times
higher than the average  MFON;  duty are not uncommon in the Quad.  Over 30 pe:rcent of
LDC exports and 15 percent of all developing country exports are potentially af.'fected by
a tariff above 15 percent in the Quad (Hoekman Ng and Olarreaga,  2002).
9Tariff peaks are also common in developing country tariff schedules,  adversely
affecting South-South trade. Bangladesh,  Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Mexico, Morocco,
Pakistan, Poland, Ukraine and Zimbabwe  (among others) haveltariffs  above 200 percent
for some products. However, on average, tariff peaks (relative to average levels of
protection) are higher in OECD nations-where the highest tariffs are on average 40
times the average tariff, whereas  among developing countries, the ratio is .12. For the
Quad, the ratio is 55. On the other end of the spectrum are Sub-Saharan African countries
for which this ratio is only around 5-indicating a much more uniform structure of
protection (Figure  1).













Source: Hoekman and Olarreaga (2002).
Moreover, the tariff structure of developed countries shows significant tariff
escalation,  so that market access for more processed products  (embodying greater value
added) is more restricted. For example, fully-processed  manufacturing food products face
tariffs twice as large as products  in the first-stage of processing in the EU and Japan, with
final goods confronting an average  MFN tariff of 24 and 65 percent, respectively. In
Canada the ratio is even higher: tariffs on fully processed food products are  12 times
higher than for 1st stage processed products (the MFN tariff on fully processed is 42
10percent). '  Trade preferences  :for developing  countries tend to be limited for tariff peak
items as these are by definition 'sensitive'  products that are often excluded or subject to
some type of quantitative limitation.
That said, for many products exported by low-income countries,  tariffs in high-
income countries are zero as a result of GSP schemes, the EU Everything But Arms
(EBA) initiative and the US African Growth and Opportunity Act.2 What matters for the
countries benefiting from such preferential access are the conditions that must be satisfied
to obtain zero-duty treatment-in particular the rules of origin. These are generally
recognized to be a major factor reducing the value of preferences.  Brenton and MAanchin
(2002) demonstrate that EU rules of origin are so restrictive as to induce between 35 and
45 percent of Central and East European exports of clothing-which in principle have
complete duty-free access to t  he EU-to enter the EU under a special customs regime,
so-called outward processing.  This allows them to avoid documenting that rules of origin
have been met, because the regime applies to products that use EU inputs.
The downsides of prei:erential trade are well known-many of them pointed out
by Finger long ago when the GSP was first introduced and efforts were being made to
create a New International Economic Order (Finger and Kreinin,  1976). They are
uncertain, subject to unilateral change or withdrawal, and can give rise to serious trade
diversion.  Similar problems as far as excluded countries are concerned are raised by
preferential trade agreements (Winters,  2001). For the 'non- or less-preferred'--those
without GSP status or those who obtain less favorable treatment than comparators
(including FTA partners)-th- challenge  is to reduce the margin of discrimination and
thus the global welfare reduci:ng trade diversion associated with preferential trade.
The market access-related policy agenda also includes contingent proteclion
(antidumping and safeguards),  removal of restrictions  on trade in services, eliminating
export subsidies and eliminating redundant red tape costs associated with enforcement of
product standards.  As noted by Finger, Ng and Wangchuk (2001), not only have
developing countries become frequent users of antidumping, but on a per dollar of import
I Figures are from Hoekman,  Ng and Olarreaga  (2001).
2 Although only EBA eliminates tariffs on all tariff lines, albeit only for LDCs and with long transition
periods for three critical products-bannas,  rice and sugar.  Most preferential  schemes exclude  or continue
to restrict products of major export interest to beneficiary  countries.
11coverage basis they are the most intensive users of antidumping (Table 4). There is al
huge market access agenda in services trade, one that spans foreign direct investment as
well as cross-border trade, and where to date only limited progress has been made in. the
WTO (Mattoo, 2001).3 Possible approaches towards pursuit of the broader market access
agenda are discussed below in Section 3.
Table 4: Antidu mping Initiations Per US Dollar of Imports 1995-99
Against All Economies
Country/Economy  No. of Antiduinpig  Initiations per US dollar of imports
Initiating  Initiations  Index (USA= 100)
Argentina  89  2125
South Africa  89  2014
Peru  21  1634
India  83  1382
New Zealand  28  1292
Venezuela  22  1174
Australia  l  89  941
Colombia  15  659
Brazil  56  596
Israel  19  418
Chile  10  376
Indonesia  20  330
Mexico  46  290
Turkey  14  204
Korea  37  185
Canada  50  172
European Union  160  130
United States  136  100
Malaysia  11  97
Source: Finger, Ng, and Wangchuk  (2001).
Rule-Making: The Domestic Regulatory  Agenda
The Single Undertaking approach in the Uruguay Round led to the inclusion into the
WTO of rules in many areas of a regulatory nature.  This was the culmination of a process
started in the Tokyo Round (1973-9). It shows few signs of abating. Negotiations are to
be launched  in 2003  on competition  law, FDI policy, transparency  in government
procurement and trade facilitation,  assuming agreement is reached on the modalities.
Efforts are also likely to expand the ambit of the WTO in areas such as environmental
3 Walmsley and Winters (2002) estimate the global gains from allowing temporary entry of both skilled and
unskilled labor services equivalent to 3% of the current workforce in OECD countries would be some  11/2
times greater  than the gains from merchandise  liberalization.
12policy. Such regulatory issues have become more prominent on the WTO agencla because
the liberalization of traditional trade policy instruments increased the visibility of
differences in national regulatory regimes. Calls for deeper integration at the multilateral
level range from coordinated application of national policies to the harmonization of
regulatory regimes. Such harmonization  is sometimes held to be necessary to ensure 'fair
trade'  or an equality of competitive opportunities for foreign and domestic  firms.
A key question from a development perspective  is to determine the rationale for
proposals to pursue deeper integration,  and, if so, whether the WTO is the appropriate
forum for this. In this connection one key criterion is to determine whether a particular
regulatory policy is being-or can be-used to restrict market access. Thus the traditional
WTO criterion for inclusion of an issue on the agenda:  whether a policy is trade related,
i.e.,  impedes market access or distorts competition on a third market. Regulatory
measures can be a substitute f or explicit barriers (e.g., product standards, regulation of
interconnection prices in telecoms, transport safety standards, access slots to sea  and
airports, and so on).  In principle, multilateral rules on preventing protectionist albuse of
such regulatory standards can be warranted in order to ensure market access.  Such rules
may lead to reciprocal benefils similar to traditional trade liberalization: greater
contestability  of domestic markets and improved market access abroad (regulatcry
barriers in developed country markets can have major implications for developing
country exporters.  The challenge is to ensure that rules do not constrain the ability of
nations to achieve their regulatory objectives, i.e. to separate what is legitimate regulation
from protectionist abuse. In theory, an unbiased 'necessity test' could be envisaged as a
way to do this-i.e., a mechanism to determine whether a specific policy is necessary to
achieve a particular objective (Mattoo and Subramanian,  1998). However,  in practice, it
is difficult to conceive of making this binding, given the associated need for litigation and
intrusive determinations by external agents such as WTO panels.  Consequently, some
kind of sectoral guidelines or limited harmonization  may be unavoidable. In practice,  as
much of the market access-related  regulatory  agenda pertains to service industries, this is
an area that will need to be addressed in the GATS context. The challenge will be to
ensure that the focus is indeed on regulatory measures where the link to explicit barriers
(market access) is clear cut. In cases where it is not or where there is a very asynimetric
13market access agenda (e.g., intellectual property), harmonization will often not be
desirable  in any event;  and questions should be raised regarding the appropriateness  of
including the policy areas in the WTO.
From a development perspective there are at least two additional considerations.  It
is often argued that a major function of international agreements  is to overcome domestic
political economy constraints that prevent the adoption of welfare-improving policies.
Thus, one can ask whether proposed regulatory rules make sense from a national
perspective in terms of addressing priorities even if  there are no externalities or market
access considerations. Another question is whether there are overall benefits from
engaging in negotiations on subjects that are not deemed to be priorities, because of
expected payoffs  in other areas. That is, does it make sense to pursue linkage strategies?
Answering these questions requires policy analysis to determine the implications of what
is on the table.
Conceptually, both questions are straightforward.  In practice, answering them is
very difficult and will require pro-active  engagement by national stakeholders  and
extensive policy research. Both questions go to the heart of the political economy
problem confronting developing countries in the Doha Development Agenda talks: how
to mobilize constituencies at home and abroad that will support market access
liberalization and the adoption of development  supportive WTO rules.  The linkage
question boils down to how to design a socially beneficial grand bargain scenario-what
can and should be offered in the context of WTO talks in order to obtain a desirable
outcome? Determining the net national benefits of a package of proposals requires taking
into account losses incurred by losers as well as benefits to those who gain, as well as the
need for (and cost of) compensation mechanisms.  Benefits will depend on the payoff to
own reforms implied in the package, and the value of the package to trading partners. The
latter will determine the feasible quid pro quo in terms of trading partner concessions  on
market access and on rules. This in turn will be a function of the intensity of interest and
the (lobbying) power of affected groups that the foreign negotiators care about-their
multinationals, NGOs, unions, etc. (Leidy and Hoekman,  1993).
Many have argued that the domestic regulatory issues that have been proposed for
inclusion on the WTO agenda are not priorities for low-income countries and risk
14diverting scarce administrative  and political resources from those that have higher
development payoffs (e.g., Winters, 2002; Hilary et al., 2002). It has also been argued
that the Uruguay Round impilementation  experience suggests that the WTO needs to
change its modus operandi when it comes to the negotiation and enforcement of
regulatory rules that require significant investment of real resources by poor cotntries
(Hoekman,  2002). A strategy of "just say no" on new issues may make good sense if a
cost-benefit  analysis suggests that the net benefits are less than what would be feasible if
resources are invested elsewhere. And, it must be recognized that scarce policymaaking
and administrative resources  in many low-income countries implies there are opportunity
costs associated with an expansion of the negotiating agenda (as policymakers will have
their tirne diverted away from issues that are more important for the country) (Winters,
2002).
However,  account should also be taken of another type of opportunity cost.
Finger's work has demonstraled  clearly that the mercantilist  dynamics that drive the
WTO require developing countries to bring  'concessions'  to the table if they are to induce
partners to liberalize politically sensitive  sectors. It is important that what is offered be in
the national interest, i.e., involve policy commitments that are seen to be desirable. It may
well be that enough is available to 'trade' on the market access agenda, especially if
account is taken of what developing  countries have to offer on services. But it may not
be. Despite the call to take development seriously, political realities may require
engagement in areas that are rtot priorities. If so, it can be argued that any rule in a
particular area should be beneficial to (supportive of) development (Hoekman, 2002).
Issue linkage involving gains .iin one area (e.g., market access) in return for agreement in
other areas that imply a welfare loss should not accepted.
In order to determine how to proceed,  developing countries must have the
capacity to define and to analyze negotiating positions in the light of national
development  objectives. Concerned groups must know how they will be affected  and
should have direct access to their "agent" in the negotiations (i.e., they must be
represented).  In some areas there is inadequate understanding of what makes
development  sense. As Finger has argued with respect to Uruguay Round issues, poor
countries have yet to attempt to create intellectual property regimes that makes traditional
15knowledge into a negotiable and defensible asset. Nor have they identified the alternative
options that can be used to upgrade and enforce national product, health and safety
standards, or to regulate  service sectors that are subject to market failures. The same can
be said for issues such as competition law or trade facilitation. In many areas, the trial
and error experience- the assessments of the real-world impacts of alternative polic,y
options - that can inform the effective incorporation of the development dimension into
multilateral rules does not exist. As discussed below, this has implications  for the types of
disciplines that might be negotiated.
3. Development  Benchmarks, Focal Points and Negotiating  Modalities
Targets and focal points for negotiations can help increase the probability that WTO rules
and negotiating outcomes  support development.  Much of Finger's work has focused on
generating economically meaningful numbers to assess the outcome of GATT/WTO
negotiations and the implications of national trade policies.4 Mention can also be made of
the effort at the World Bank in the 1980s under his leadership to calculate coverage ratios
and frequency indices to quantify the prevalence  and incidence of nontariff barriers
(Nogues, Olechowski and Winters, 1986). Such data are critical in mobilizing support
for-and monitoring progress of-reform.
General indicators of success in making the Doha Development Agenda a reality
can be easily identified:  (i) ownership of negotiated agreements by constituencies in
developing countries (with the corollary that substantial agreement exists that multilateral
disciplines will help address national development priorities, i.e. there is a high 'return on
investment'); (ii) significantly improved market access; and (iii) more effective 'aid for
trade'. Achieving these outcomes will require a great deal of effort by developing
countries to build support for reforms in OECD countries and at home. Identifying
benchmarks regarding what would be Pareto-improving  from a development perspective
and negotiating modalities to attain them can help making the Doha development agenda
a reality.
4 E.g.,  Finger,  1974,  1976a; Finger and Schuler,  2000; Finger,  Ingco and Reincke,  1996;  Finger,  Ng,
and Wangchuk,  2002.
16Market Access Benchmarks and  Formulae
Because developing countiy exports are disproportionately affected by tariff peaks
(products subject to peaks :represent  15 to 30 percent of total LDC exports to the US, EU,
Japan and Canada),  their elimination should be high on the WTO agenda.  A benchmark
here could be the ratio of maximum to average tariffs for WTO members.  Given that in
many developing countries the ratio is five-e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America-compared to an average of 40 in OECD countries (see above)-the: benchmark
should be less than five-e.g., three. This would be directly beneficial to developing
countries in market access t:erms by reducing peaks and help improve efficiency by
lowering the dispersion of effective protection in WTO Members.  It would also have
indirect benefits. Assume a benchmark is also agreed for a reduction in the average level
of tariffs-say  50 percent,  LS in the Kennedy Round. Then, as the average tariff declines,
the maximum tariff would also have to decline, indirectly providing further benefits to
countries with limited ability (market power) to negotiate tariffs down on their exports
through request-offer  bargaining (Hoekman and Olarreaga, 2002). This is a major
advantage of a formula-based negotiating process.5
The use of tariff-cutting formulae such as the one just discussed can be an
effective means of moving towards  greater uniformity of national rates of protection,
which is very desirable from a development perspective (Tarr, 2002).  Formulae were not
used in the Uruguay Round,  except in the context of so-called zero-for-zero negotiations,
where the aim was to move tariffs to zero for certain products conditional on a large
enough set of WTO members agreeing to do this,6 and in agriculture,  where targets were
set for the average cut in tarniffs (36 percent),  with minimum cuts of 15 percent. The
Uruguay Round showed the need for care in the formulation of tariff reduction
objectives-a 36 percent average cut is different from a 36 percent cut in the average.7
5As first noted by Finger (1974,  1976a),  in GATT negotiations the 'concessions'  offered by countries to
each other were largely on items on which they were the 'principal'  supplier,  that is,  there was a large
degree of internalisation of the benefits measures  in trade volume terms. In the Uruguay Round, Finger
found that the balance of concessions  made  and obtained,  again in a mercantilist sense,  was skewed
towards high-income countries (Finger,  Ingco and Reincke,  1996;  Finger and Nogues,  2001).
6An important example was the Iaformation Technology  Agreement-see  Hoekman  and  Sstecki (2001).
As noted by Francois  and Martin (2002b),  the former can be achieved by undertaking  very high
17While the request-offer approach helps to liberalize trade, it may increase the variance  in
protection.  Formulae to reduce dispersion in protection and move higher rates down more
than.  lower ones were used in the Tokyo Round (1973-9), as well as earlier rounds. The
experience with the use of formulae illustrates that this is a viable technique, but that the
outcome depends  substantially on the magnitude of exemptions that are invoked by
countries (Baldwin and Clarke,  1988). In order to achieve greater uniformity of
protection as well as a decline in the average MFN rate, exceptions must be kept to a
minimum. Monitoring and quantification of the implications of proposed exceptions is an
important task for national policy researchers.
A major issue for developing countries  is to obtain 'credit' for autonomous
liberalization.  In the past, efforts to obtain such credit did not succeed in part because
negotiations center on tariff bindings, and developing countries bound only few tariff
rates (reflecting the non-reciprocity  strategy that was a pillar of the special and
differential treatment status) (Michalopoulos,  2001). The shift to full participation by
developing countries implies that they have a lot to offer in terms of binding past
unilateral liberalization -essentially  the difference between applied rates and the much
higher ceiling bindings or complete absence of bindings scheduled under the WTO. The
problem confronting developing countries is that despite arguments that there is value to
binding tariffs at levels above applied rates (see Francois and Martin, 2002a), in practice
mercantilist negotiators are unwilling to 'pay' much for such bindings.8 Instead, they
want to see reductions in applied rates.
The challenge then is to design a mechanism that increases the mercantilist value
of binding in the WTO negotiating  context. One way to do this is to incorporate this in
the formulae used for negotiation and the benchmark that is used to assess the outcome.
Given that OECD countries have already bound virtually all their tariff lines at applied
percentage cuts in  very low tariffs rates, thereby  allowing high tariffs  not to be cut at all.
8  See Mattoo  and Olarreaga (2000)  and Michalopoulos  (2001) for discussions of credit.  There is  some
confusion in  the literature  on giving developing countries  'credit'  for past liberalization.  This tends to be
premised  on the assumption that by having implemented unilateral reforms,  these countries have  lost
negotiating coin.  While  true in a mechanistic sense, in  practice the markets of most developing countries
tend to be so small they have little if any negotiating power in  the first place.  What matters for the WTO
are the tariff bindings,  the extent to which unilateral reforms  are locked-in.  The resistance by most
developing countries before  the Uruguay  Round to bind tariffs  implied that implementing a credit rule
was very difficult,  if not impossible.
18rates, any formula that gives weight to both additional  bindings (increases  in ithe ratio of
the number of bound to unbound lines) and reductions in the absolute differen,ce between
bound and applied rates, will automatically give credit to developing countries in terms of
attaining an agreed target level of liberalization.  What this implies is that formulae need
to focus on bound  rates and not (or at least not exclusively)  on applied tariff rates.9
More far-reaching than the foregoing suggestions would be to seek to remove all
tariffs on industrial products traded among OECD countries.  Proposals to this effect have
been made periodically by industry groups. They argue that the low average level of such
MFN tariffs, in conjunction with free trade treatment for goods produced in regional
integration partner countries that is often impeded by rules of origin, implies that such
tariffs have become  'nuisance' taxes, the collection of which generates costs that exceed
the revenue collected. Settinig a deadline-say 5 years-for the elimination of industrial
tariffs on a nondiscriminatory  basis would send a strong signal that development is being
taken seriously. If this approach is pursued it would of course have implications for a
formulae-based negotiating  approach, which would then apply to agricultural tariffs of all
WTO members and to the industrial tariffs of developing countries.
For the services negotiations, market access benchmarks and formulae  to achieve
them can also be developed. Given that there is only limited coverage  of the sector-
specific commitments on nai'ional treatment and market access in the GATS,'the simplest
benchmark would pertain to the sectoral coverage ratio and/or the number of sectors
where no restrictions on national treatment and market access are maintained  (Hoekman,
1996). For many developing countries the coverage of specific commitments is well
below 50 percent of all services and modes of supply.'0 Binding the status quo would
help reduce uncertainty, whi]e pre-committing to future reform can help increase the
relevance of the GATS. 1  l Given the importance of movement of natural services
9  Francois and Martin (2002b) propose a specific  modification of the so-called Swiss formula (used in  the
Tokyo Round) for the Doha negotiations and explore the implications of alternative  specifications. For
general discussions of formulae, see Panagariya  (2002), Laird and Yeats (1987) and  Stem (1976).
10 Hoekman (1996) calculated  that at the end of the Uruguay Round,  developing countries  madle
commitments on  15 percent of all :,ervice  activities,  with one quarter making commitments  covering  less
than 3 percent of all services.
" Mattoo (2001) has  argued that the GATS  can serve  as a pre-commitment  device, i.e. a mechlanism that
locks in the government  to a pre-anmounced  set of reforms.  While this is  certainly the case,  it should also
be recognized  that doing this may also establish a de facto upper bound on the extent of reforras.  Lahouel
19providers as a mode of contesting foreign service markets for developing  countries,
explicit quantitative targets for 'mode 4' visas could be considered-for example, a
minimum share of total service sector employment.  Even if not used as the focal point for
negotiations, this can be a metric for judging the outcome of negotiations (Hoekman,
Mattoo and Olarreaga,  2002).
Rules for  policies affecting market access
WTO rules on policies such as subsidies, preferential trade, and contingent protection
have an important bearing on market access (Finger,  1994). All three are on the Doha,
negotiating agenda.
Subsidies. The Doha language calling for elimination of agricultural export
subsidies is clearly of great importance for developing countries that have a comparative
advantage in the products affected, both directly and indirectly.  While attaining this
objective will undoubtedly be difficult, the benchmark is clear and is a good one. The
primary need will be to establish a deadline to achieve the objective. Matters are more
difficult when it comes to other subsidies.  In principle, de-coupling subsidies from
production makes sense, but in practice it will always be hard to achieve (enforce), given
the plethora of potential instruments that can be used by governments.  Even the EU-
which goes far beyond the WTO in this area-has encountered recurrent difficulties  in
enforcing restrictions  on the use of state aids within the Community. NAFTA does not
even try to tackle this issue.  A pragmatic approach has been suggested by Snape (1987,
1991), who argues for the principle of domestic subsidy freedom.  Given that there is a
rationale for subsidies in many contexts and that the revealed preference of many
governments  to use subsidies,  it would appear more effective to focus on reduction of
border barriers and the abolition of explicit export subsidies.  This would automatically
impose serious constraints on the feasibility of production  subsidies by greatly increasing
their costs.
Antidumping. The existence of antidumping  induces rent-seeking behavior on the
part of import-competing firms, and creates substantial uncertainty regarding the
(2002)  has noted that in the MENA region the country that used the GATS for pre-commitment purposes
on telecoms-Tunia-endM  up reformiing  less than other MENA countries that did not make
20conditions of market access facing exporters.  Investigations have a chilling eifect on
imports (they are a signal to importers to diversify away from targeted  suppliers) and are
often facilitating devices for the conclusion of market sharing or price-fixing  agreements
with affected exporters (see Bloningen and Prusa 2002 for a survey of the evidence).
Finger has been at the forefront of analysis of the incentive effects of antidumnping,  as
well as the (rather unsuccessful!)  fight against antidumping.  The best policy in this regard
has been known for a long time-abolish the instrument.  Safeguards are  a better and
more honest instrument to address the problem antidumping is used for-providing
import-competing industries with time to adjust to increased foreign competition (Finger,
1996). Greater discipline  on the use of the instrument could involve determining the
impact on the economy of imposing duties through so-called public interest clauses. As
Finger has argued effectively,  what is needed is to give opponents  of imposingj
antidumping duties a chance to score goals-current legislation and WTO rules only
impose weak procedural disciplines on import-competing  industries and do not give users
of imports a voice. Thus,  oln the antidumping playing field, import-competing  interests
are the only ones who can score (Finger, 2002). The problem is a political economy one:
a necessary condition for reform is greater mobilization of countervailing forces in the
domestic political arena.12
Regionalism. Much has been written about WTO rules on preferential  trade (free
trade agreements,  customs unions, etc.). Finger (1993b)  suggests that much of the
literature proposing strengthened disciplines is misconceived in that it ignores political
economy realities. These are twofold: on the one hand, the political objectives underlying
the desire of many countries to pursue regional  arrangements, which is hard to discipline,
and on the other hand, the incentive of outsiders (non-members)  to defend their
negotiated access 'rights'  to the markets of member countries through multilateral rounds
of negotiations.  The conclusion is that this is an area where the payoff to rule making will
be low. The most powerful instrument to reduce discrimination is likely to be careful
commitments-where  unilaterhrei,ortns proceeded  faster anad went further.
12 Given that no effort is  usually made to determine  whether markets are contestable,  another way to reduce
protectionist bias is  for governments to put greater effort into determining whether the conditions alleged to
give rise to 'unfair trade'  actually exist.  Suggestions that have been made in  this regard include making
antidumping conditional on a determination that the exporters home market is  not contestable,  and shifting
away from an 'injury-to-competitors'  standard towards an 'injury to competition standard'  (Hoekman and
21analysis of the effects of preferential trade agreements-this  will help motivate countries
to push for further reduction in the external tariffs of members.  Hoekman and Kostecki
(2001) argue that there is one exception where multilateral rule making could be
beneficial-agreement  to apply the general origin rules that have been developed by the
World Customs Organization to all types of trade, whether preferential or
nonpreferential.
Summing up, a good case can be made that the returns to rule making in these
areas are likely to be low. A lesson from Finger (199 lc) is that GATT/WTO rules thalt
help to achieve agreed trade liberalization have been much more effective than rules that
try to prescribe liberalization.  The major engine of the WTO is reciprocity.  Members
have strong incentives to defend negotiated market access 'concessions'  and this should
be taken into account when considering additional  rule making. In the case of domestic,
non-export subsidies and preferential  trade, much can be achieved by reducing external
border barriers to trade. Thus, a good case exists that the primary benchmark from a
development perspective should be the extent to which market access is liberalized, not
so much the types of rules that are imposed on trade policies that indirectly affect market
access conditions.
That said, it should be recognized that in the area of services, market access and
regulation are closely intertwined, and that it is necessary to address regulatory policies
that impede effective entry into services  markets. A key question is how to do so in the
GATS context. Services  are activities where there is often need for some type of
regulation to address market failures or achieve social (noneconomic) objectives.
Moreover, technological developments  have major implications for the design of
appropriate regulatory  instruments to ensure both efficiency and equity. A good case can
be made that many of the 'backbone'  services that are critical to development-transport,
energy, telecoms, finance-increasingly  have become industries where network
externalities are important.  An implication is that regulation to ensure that markets are
contestable needs to focus not only on 'traditional'  types of entry barriers-outright  bans,
licensing, etc.-but on the ability to connect to the network at a reasonable price, apply
the relevant technologies, etc. Designing and enforcing policies to achieve  this is
Mavroidis,  1996).
22anything but trivial, suggesting a cautious approach towards the setting of enf'orceable
international standards  in the WTO  (see, e.g., Claessens 2002, Evans 2002 and Trolliet
and Hegarty, 2002 for recent sectoral analyses).  In many cases, regulatory thinking and
economic analysis is still evolving rapidly when it comes to network industries, and
technological developmenlts  may make specific types of interventions redundamt or
counterproductive.  Careful assessments of the implications of alternative types of
international cooperation--which  may be regional rather than multilateral-are required
to determine what options might be most appropriate for developing countries.
Non market access-related  rule making
Setting benchmarks  for 'behind-the-border'  regulatory norms is more difficult.  However,
doing so is important  given that the Doha declaration calls for the launch of negotiations
on subjects such as investment and competition policies. Given the general presumption
that regulatory regimes should reflect local conditions,  substantive harmonization often
will be inappropriate.  Finger has argued that what is needed in the behind the border
regulatory  areas is to design agreements that are flexible and encourage learning and
experimentation.  The easiest way to ensure this  is not to include issues in the WTO.
Alternatively,  if  included,  flexibility can be maintained by limiting agreemenis on
regulatory subjects to due process and transparency type requirements.
A more far-reaching alternative would be, using the language of EU la2w,  to move
towards  'directives'-which identify desirable outcomes but leave it to national
governments how to attain them-and away from 'regulation'-which identify how an
objective is to be attained. ]:f such an approach  is taken, a change in approach towards
enforcement of agreements that entail substantial investment requirements or institutional
strengthening should also be considered. Rather than binding dispute settlement that
operates with the threat of trade sanctions (retaliation), a process of multilateral
surveillance can be envisaged, complemented by efforts to assist governments attain the
objectives underlying the particular agreement or set of rules (Hoekman, 2002). "  This
approach could be strengthened by linking implementation of resource intensive
disciplines to the provision of funding by high-income WTO members to build
3  In  the competition context sonle discussion has been devoted to a system of voluntary peer review.  See
23implementation capacity in low-income economies (Finger, 2001). This combination of
initiatives could do much to reduce the perceived downside risk of engaging in
negotiations on the Singapore  or similar issues.
Special and  differential treatment
The foregoing approach implies an alternative to the traditional  'differential and more
favorable treatment' method of pursuing the 'development dimension'  in the WTO.
Rather than seek to establish a two-tier system of rights and obligations it would be
preferable to ensure that the WTO is fully supportive of development.  Most of the
provisions in WTO agreements calling for special and differential (S&D) treatment of
developing countries are so-called 'best endeavor'  commitments-they  are not binding
on high-income countries. No dispute settlement cases can be launched by a developing
country government on the basis of non-delivery on promises embedded in WTO
agreements.  The same cannot be said of the WTO's substantive disciplines-these are
binding. Taking development seriously implies that traditional S&D should cease to be
applied.  Instead, what is needed is to 'mainstream'  development in the WTO by moving
towards a more cooperative,  less litigious, model where the emphasis is put on
multilateral monitoring and surveillance  and working with countries to attain their
objectives through the provision of effective financial and technical  assistance.
One reason for the implementation problems that were encountered in the late
1990s was that the best-endeavors commitments on assistance that were made by OECD
trade negotiators were not 'owned'  by counterpart agencies in their governments that
controlled the money (development assistance).  Moving towards a more cooperative
model on non-market access-related regulatory areas would be facilitated by involving
development  agencies more in the WTO process. Greater consultation  and interaction
between trade and development agencies can occur both in- and outside the WTO-
through regular meetings of trade and development ministers, national workshops on the
role of trade in the poverty-reduction  strategy and active engagement by development
institutions on issues that have a direct bearing on development.  The existence of
OECD (2002).
24mechanisms  to ensure that such interaction occurs  could be another benchmarkc to assess
the development relevance of the negotiating outcome.
Policy.  Research and  Advocacy
In his writings, Finger has emphasized that because the WTO is an exporter-driven
institution it is very difficult for the WTO to be a forum for constructive  and serious
debate on issues of public policy and economic development.  An implication is that
developing countries themselves must defend their interests in the WTO, both by
knowing what would help achieve their objectives and priorities  and by having  a strategy
to attain those objectives-what to offer, how to design packages of proposals,  etc.
Effective advocacy in support of initiatives that support development requires building of
partnerships and coalitions with trade and non-trade groups at home, as well  as with
foreign groups (e.g., consumer organizations,  importers, the environmental  lobby and
global development NGOs).
In all of this analysis is critical.  Identifying who gains and who loses from
existing policies is importarnt both to determine  the need for policy change and. to build
support for such change.  For example, documenting how specific OECD policies hurt the
poor both at home and in developing countries can have a powerful  effect on rnobilizing
support for welfare improving reforms. US cotton subsidies and trade barriers against
peanuts hurt poor laborers  and farmers in West Africa; fishing and coal subsidies have
major detrimental  effects on the environment;  while ever tighter food safety norms with
nonmeasurable public health benefits impose severe costs on developing country
producers-e.g.,  aflatoxin standards (Wilson, 2002). As has been emphasized  by
Bhagwati  and Panagariya (2000), building coalitions with NGOs and other groups that
care about development is vital in generating the political momentum that is needed to
improve access in sensitive sectors and improve the rules of the game  in the WTO.
Collaborative research and cooperation between think tanks and policy  institutes
that focuses on how WTO disciplines can contribute to improving the investment climate
and supporting economic  growth prospects  must be done at the national level. It will not
be done by WTO members (trading partners)-their focus will be to identify changes in
institutions and regulations i:hat are expected to expand the sales of their exporters. The
Uruguay Round-with a little bit of help by Mike Finger-taught us that implementation
25of WTO agreements can cost serious money and that this may be money ill-spent.
Understanding ex ante what the implications  (costs and benefits) of WTO obligations will
be is therefore vital: Trade policy analysis and strategy formulation needs to start with a
development focus that identifies  domestic priorities for action as opposed to being
driven by the export interests of trading partners.
Aidfor Trade: Capacity  Building
The Doha declaration contains numerous commitments to provide technical assistance.  In
March 2002, the WTO secretariat obtained commitments totaling CHF30 million to
organize seminars in developing countries to improve awareness and understanding  of
the Doha process and agenda. In parallel, assistance is being provided to LDCs under the
auspices of the Integrated Framework (IF) for trade-related technical assistance, a joilt
effort of six international  agencies  (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD,  UNDP, World Bank and
WTO), bilateral donors and LDC governments. This is an effort that Mike Finger played
an important role in revitalizing and redesigning before retiring from the World Bank. in
2001. The aim of the IF is to work with LDCs to undertake  diagnostic studies to identify
barriers to integration,  assist countries determine if  and how trade issues should be
integrated into the national development  strategy and to provide follow-up trade-related
technical  and financial assistance to address the constraints.
The need for technical assistance and capacity building extends well beyond the
next WTO ministerial.  Finger's work suggests that assistance should support analytical
and operational research at the country level, aimed at mobilizing constituencies that
have an interest in domestic policy reform and using multilateral initiatives to pursue this.
Capacity-building  programs to assist national stakeholders define trade policy reform
priorities and objectives must be country-driven and target think tanks, key NGOs,
parliaments  and the private sector, as well as government officials.  External policy advice
and diagnostic  studies can help in this process,  but what matters fundamentally is active
engagement in the policy formulation process by national stakeholders outside the public
sector, given the political pressures and constraints government research bodies are
subject to (Finger 1981 a).
26Commitment by the development  community to enhance trade capacity through
lending and grants to address needs in specific areas-e.g., transport, product standards
certification or trade facilitation-is also important. Without supply side capacity
countries will not be able to benefit from better market access. Whether building trade
capacity rather than investing in other areas-such as health or education-is appropriate
is a policy decision. The challenge for national policymakers  is to identify the areas
where the net social return to domestic action is highest; the challenge for the
development community is to assist countries to do this and to provide support, in the
areas that are identified.
Capacity building in both senses of the term used above is a long-term endeavor.
In contrast,  many of the policy instruments impeding market access-tariffs, rules of
origin, antidumping-can be removed in short order if  the political will is there. The
same applies to improving multilateral rulemaking. Technical assistance  is no1  a
substitute for rapid concerted action on market access and rule-setting that supports
development.
4.  Concluding Remarks
Market access-the traditional domain of the GATT/WTO-is critical in creating the
incentives to use trade as a vehicle for poverty-reducing  growth. It is an area where a lot
remains to be done. Of much greater importance however is to improve domestic
policies, strengthen instituti.ons and enhance supply side trade capacity in developing
countries.  The latter has nuimerous dimensions-many of which play a major role in
defining the investment climate. Most of the policy agenda associated with tralde capacity
enhancement is domestic-it is up to civil societies and governments to define beneficial
policy changes and to set piiorities in the context of an overall development strategy and
to allocate scarce resources accordingly.  Building trade capacity demands resources-as
Finger would argue, it is not a free good, as market access is. Thus, the payofl  for
building trade capacity rather than using resources elsewhere is an investment decision,
not a given.
Two major conclusions emerge from Finger's research regarding economic
development and the WTO are particularly relevant to the Doha agenda.  First, don't
27neglect that old GATT magic (Finger,  1991 c). There are still great gains to be had - and
no mistakes to be made - from traditional trade liberalization. This liberalization agenda
spans both industrialized nations and developing countries themselves, and includes: not
only goods but also services.  Most-of the potential gains from market opening are
generated by own reforms.  But action by high-income countries along the lines suggested
previously would have a major impact in making the WTO more supportive of the
growth prospects  of developing  countries. Elimination of industrial tariffs by OECD
countries before a specific date, a major reduction in agricultural tariff peaks  and
escalation, a deadline for the phase-out and banning of export subsidies, and a significant
expansion of service sector commitments,  including mode 4 service supply opportunities
on a nondiscriminatory basis would do much to eliminate the 'development credibility'
deficit of the WTO.
Second, no matter what agenda is pursued in the WTO as regards non-border,
regulatory policies, getting the development dimension right will require
experimentation. Flexibility is needed in setting rules in areas that concern domestic
regulatory regimes and institutions, particularly where there are significant ancillary or
corollary investments and reforms needed.  Developing  countries must approach WTO
negotiations with a firm view of their national priorities, and seek to ensure that
multilateral obligations will assist in, and not detract from, the realization of development
objectives.  For the development community this implies priority should be given to
strengthening the capacity to identify national priorities and to analyze the costs and
benefits of proposed agreements in light of those priorities.
Finger has emphasized that multilateral rule making often will have a much lower
payoff than creating mechanisms through which governments are helped to move
towards welfare improving outcomes.  Reciprocity and the fierce desire to protect
negotiated market access concessions made the GATT the success it was. There is still a
lot of life left in the GATT model. Developing countries have a lot to offer in market
access terms, especially if services-related policies are considered and an approach
towards negotiations is adopted that gives 'credit' for binding past liberalization in the
WTO.  As far as the domestic regulatory issues are concerned  that many want to see on
the WTO agenda, the approach of quid pro quo bargaining with resulting norms that are
28ultimately enforced through the threat of trade sanctions should be reconsidered.  An
approach that is basea more explicitly on focal points ("good practices"), international
cooperation  (closer interaction between trade and development communities), and
multilateral  monitoring and surveillance is likely to be more effective than efforts to set
ever more detailed regulatory standards.  Whatever approach is adopted, research of the
Finger variety-informative,  numerate, policy relevant and accessible to non-
specialists-is critical to ensure that the outcome of negotiations will support
development.  This must involve quantification and serious efforts to determine the costs
and benefits of alternative options, as well as ex post assessments of outcomes.
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